




In her Feminist Edges of the Qur’an, Aysha Hidayatullah argues
that certain Qur’anic verses are incorrigibly male-privileging
and are themselves privileged. Hence, egalitarian readings of
the Qur’an are unsupported and unsupportable. If, as egalitari-
ans propose, such verses are unjust, then either the Qur’an is
not God’s word or God is unjust. In contrast, I aruge that there
is no evidence to suggest that any verses are incorrigibly male-
privileging and provide or indicate egalitarian rereadings for
relevant contenders and that, in any case, no Qur’anic evidence
warrants the primacy of such verses. Finally, since controvert-
ing egalitarian readings of such verses are available, the logical
form of Hidayatullah’s argument merely shows that if they are
read to exhibit injustice, those readings cannot be God’s word.
Since the Qur’an is God’s word, there is no option but to reread
them. 
A Reclamation
Insofar as conservative readings of the Qur’an invest men alone with the ca-
pacity to understand and therefore interpret God’s Word, they are patriarchal.
A women-led rebellion, one that insists on reclaiming God’s Word from those
who deny full equality to believing women, against conservative Muslim be-
liefs has begun. This undertaking relies upon the Qur’an itself to deny that only
men have the above-mentioned capacity. Two leading proponents in this regard
are the egalitarian scholars Asma Barlas and Amina Wadud.1
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Egalitarian readers believe that the Qur’an’s message frees believers
from the misogynistic customs and practices of the pre-Islamic era. Ranged
against them are the combined forces of conservative patriarchal Muslim
scholars, the governments of Muslim-dominated countries in league with
such scholars, and, regrettably, a multitude – perhaps even a majority – of
believers who are bound by the weight of history to the spiritual lead of such
scholars reinforced by local jurisprudence and the compulsion of custom.
The Qur’an, as read by patriarchal conservatives, supports such practices as
denying women an education; involvement in legal institutions, politics, or
governance; the right to drive or travel without male approval or a male fam-
ily member or relative; and, at the familial and intimate level, male ascen-
dancy in the home and the bedroom. 
Barlas’ and Wadud’s scholarly works invite a spiritual Islamic upheaval,
for they mount scholarly assaults upon traditional gender-favoring readings.
The issues with which they wrestle are complex, as are their resultant argu-
ments – sometimes unremittingly so.2 Each scholar has faced problems with a
very few Qur’anic verses that have historically been read to support a gender-
favoring patriarchy. In what follows, I examine the claims of Aysha A. Hiday-
atullah, a believing woman who claims to be a feminist but nevertheless
supports patriarchal doctrines.3 Although her assertions are cast in academic
terms, the outcome of her assertions and my examination of them are as far
from merely academic as they could possibly be. 
In outline, Hidayatullah accepts that a preponderance of verses promote
gender equality. With apparent reluctance, however, she concludes that certain
verses are intractably male-privileging: Even if they do not support a recog-
nizably modern world equality of men and women, they nonetheless support
a kind of equality that acknowledges male hierarchy. She ends by offering a
dramatic dilemma: Either God is not just, or the Qur’an is not God’s word.
We will show that she fails to provide evidence for her key contention, that
select verses are incorrigibly male privileging, which causes her dramatic
dilemma to fail. We will ignore the first stage of her rebuke of egalitarians
(pp.1-110), which reviews the history and methods of “feminist exegetes” ex-
cept to note one quibble: Her use of the term feminism.4
Even if Western feminists do share egalitarian views about misogynistic
practices in Muslim countries, it does not follow that Qur’anic egalitarians are
Western feminists. Egalitarians find false testimony, weak analysis, and flawed
reasoning within patriarchal interpretations. They act not in the interests of
“women’s rights,” but in the interest of liberating the Qur’anic voice from the
iron patriarchal hand that has been on its throat, stifling it for centuries.
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Muslim women’s experiences reading scripture do not fit into a trajectory
of Western feminism. Egalitarians do not sort out the Qur’an for women or
men, but for believers. They raise the question of whether it may be read for
equality and offer firm grounds for such a reading in order to reveal the mean-
ings of those Qur’anic passages that have been obscured or misunderstood
throughout the post-revelatory centuries of what arguably amounts to the
resurgence of pre-revelation (jāhilī) customs and practices.
Equality, Justice, and Gender
Hidayatullah adopts the posture of a Qur’anic “feminist”5 because, as a be-
liever, she accepts the infallibility of God’s Word. On the other hand, she
proclaims her dissatisfaction with those who contend that the Word invariably
supports the anti-patriarchal, anti-misogynistic, and egalitarian vision of lib-
eratory readers. She assaults egalitarians with direct challenges (Feminist
Edges, pp. 131-38 passim): It is “dishonest” to say that the Word is egalitarian
because “it continually addresses men, not women” about sex and marriage.
Moreover, men are addressed as “agents” and women merely as “passive ob-
jects” upon which men exercise their agency. Second, different Qur’anic
verses (āyāt) tell men they are the family’s mainstay and leader, that it is al-
right for them to have sex with their wives when and how they want, that
they can beat their wives, and that they are advantaged in ways that women
are not.
Consider this: If the Qur’an predominantly addressed men on matters of
marriage and sexuality, would this reflect a favoring of men, an acknowledge-
ment of their greater importance? The revelations ordained remedies for injus-
tices inflicted upon those victimized in pre-Islamic societies. The changes left
many people confused, searching for understanding. Before revelation, the
stronger (men) were allowed to prey on the weaker and questions of justice
were settled by custom. Patriarchs put female babies to death and owned wives
as personal chattel. They could rape, abuse, beat, or even beat to death or sum-
marily dispossess themselves of their marital partners as if they were no more
than used household stuff. With the advent of revelation, however, these plain-
tive men, upset by new rules, their customs disrupted, and overmatched by an
Almighty voice, understandably posed the majority of questions. A merciful
Allah responded by addressing them, limiting and constraining their former
misogynistic practices. 
Moreover, it is absurd to suggest that God’s voice was not heard by
those women within earshot. Women, freed from injustice and realizing
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God’s mercy and now able to recognize and relieve their suffering, had less
reason to probe the limits of this newly revealed justice. It is understandable,
if rather less charitable, to note that women had less reason to complain:
They “heard” what was proclaimed. Being freed from injustice is, perhaps,
its own revelation. 
There is no evidence here of men’s privilege. There is merely evidence,
understandable by all of human experience, that men suffered greater angst
about the changes brought to their prior ascendancy and sought clarifi-
cation about the limits of their roles. There is evidence, in short, that men’s
pre-revelatory conduct fell short of God’s justice and required the Word’s
redress. 
Gender-Privileging Verses?
We now turn to the second and major thrust of Hidayatullah’s Feminist Edges
of the Qur’an: her evidence for anti-egalitarian verses. To begin, she invokes
Kecia Ali’s6 observations in Sexual Ethics and Islam that Q. 2:187 and Q.
2:222-23 provide for “male agency and female passivity” in initiating sex.
Further, Q. 2:223 “objectifies women ... as matter to be acted upon” (Ali,
p.130). Hidayatullah concludes that these āyāt “prescribe behavior” based
on an assumption of male control. Qur’anic commentaries on intimacy “con-
tain no appeal for female freedom to act” (Ali, p. 131); “... men, not women,
are in control of sexual relations since they ... are the only active participants
in determining the parameters of sexual conduct with them” (Hidayatullah,
p. 135). 
Let’s consider the verses referred to, specifically Q. 2.187 and Q. 2.222-
23, respectively. 
Permitted to you, on the night of the fasts, is the approach to your wives....
(translation Yusuf Ali)7
They ask thee concerning women’s courses. Say: They are a hurt and a
pollution: So keep away from women in their courses, and do not approach
them until they are clean. But when they have purified themselves, ye may
approach them in any manner, time, or place ordained for you by Allah.
For Allah loves those who turn to Him constantly and He loves those who
keep themselves pure and clean.Your wives are as a tilth unto you; so ap-
proach your tilth when or how ye will; but do some good act for your souls
beforehand; and fear Allah. And know that ye are to meet Him (in the
Hereafter), and give (these) good tidings to those who believe. (translation
Yusuf Ali).
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Hidayatullah’s and Yusuf Ali’s readings represent those of conservative
patriarchal readers. However, a careful reading of Q. 2:222-23 shows that no
such behavior is prescribed. Rather, the āyāt define when men might approach
their wives for intimacy. They address men because men, no longer entitled to
take women at will and uncertain of what has been ordained, asked when post-
menses sex was permitted (Q. 2:222-23) and whether sex was permitted during
Ramadan (Q. 2:187). 
Much has been made of a single word in Q. 2:223: Hidayatullah reads a
key phrase (Ar. fa’tū ḥarthakum annā shi’tum) as “directing men to approach
what they cultivate as they will” (cf. p. 161). Similarly, Ali takes the verse to
entail that women are “matter to be acted on” and not “agents in their own
right” (op.cit. pp.129-30). Apparently both of them understand the metaphorical
term ḥarth to mean “tilth,” which indeed is something that is cultivated and
may be seeded. Presumably each commentator then construes this figurative
term to mean “wife.” Tilth is widely accepted in the English translations as
conveying the sense of the Arabic ḥarth. 
But to begin with, it is simply inaccurate to read fa’tū ḥarthakum as in-
structing a man to “seed his tilth.” Both Ali and Hidayatullah seem to take the
imperative tense (fa’tū) as commanding men to initiate sex with their wives.
There are two grammatical confusions here. The first one is that context deter-
mines whether the imperative mood commands or permits. A child asks his fa-
ther when he may go out, and the father replies: “Go out when you finish your
chores,” thereby granting permission, as opposed to commanding. Men ask
when they can resume having sex with their menstruating wives, and are in-
formed that they must wait until this process has finished and their wives have
purified themselves with water. Only then may they approach, come to, or seek
out their tilth (more about tilth as we proceed). 
The second grammatical confusion is evident from Ali’s handling of the
conjunction “as” (Ar. annā), for it may mean either “when” or “how.” However,
barring a detailed explanation, it cannot mean both, for again the meaning is
wholly determined by context. So, the house painter asks: “Should I use a brush
or a roller?” and the answer: “As you wish” means “paint how you wish,” that
he is free to use either one. What is the context in Q. 2:222-23? A man must
refrain from sexual relations with his wife “during” her menses “until she is
clean,” then “after she purifies herself” approach .... In any language, “during,”
“until,” “then,” and “after” are temporal in character and therefore do not even
remotely mention “how” one is to approach his wife. The conventional patri-
archal reading provided by Ali (“approach them in any manner, time ...”) is
thus clearly unsupported by any element of the context.
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The religious conventions of Islam, like those of Judaism, address ques-
tions of when marital intimacy is permitted. This alone undermines the con-
tention that Q. 2:223 ordains or implies male control of marital intimacy.
Hidayatullah may believe that male control has traction because women are
referred to by the figurative term ḥarth, translated as “field” or “tilth.”
Admittedly, tilth is soil prepared for seeding. But the husband clearly
plays no active role in its preparation, for it is the wife who, through self-
conscious and ordained ritual bathing, prepares herself for his approach.
Since the imperative (Ar. fa’tū) is permissive, not commanding, and since
the limits indicated by the verses are explicitly temporal, no part of Q. 2:223
indicates that his approach entails his right to sexual intimacy without regard
to her consent. 
The sole sense in which the husband might play a role, albeit an indirect
one, in preparing his tilth is explicitly dependent on his wife’s sexual agency.
If a husband has cared for his wife, has shown gentle kindness and generosity
(as Hidayatullah agrees the preponderance of the Qur’an’s verses enjoin),
his love and respect are directed toward encouraging her self-aware activities
of tilling, specifically her ritual bathing. But notice that if this is how the hus-
band’s contribution to cultivating his tilth is conceived, it is utterly mutual
and equitably reciprocated by her indication (i.e., ritual bathing) that she wel-
comes intimacy. Equally, if this is the husband’s contribution, it reduces male
privilege from initiating sexual contact to that of nurturing affection as a
foundation for marital intimacy – a privilege that is fully and equally a
woman’s.
Not incidentally, this explanation also makes far greater sense of under-
standing ḥarth as referring not to the enriched soil found in gardens and avail-
able for seeding, but the “garden” of intimacy itself, in which mutual cultivation
and reciprocity are found and nourished. Such an interpretation is warranted,
inasmuch as Ali’s concern over Q. 2:223’s tilth (ḥarth) is a concern over an
manifestly metaphorical reference. As a metaphor, tilth cannot work seamlessly
between Q. 2:223 and Q. 42:20. Consider the two following translations of the
latter verse:
Whoever desires the harvest [ḥarth] of the Hereafter, We increase for him in
his harvest [ḥarth], And whoever desires the harvest [harth] of this world ...
(42:20, Sahih International)
To any that desires the tilth [ḥarth] of the Hereafter, We give increase in
his tilth [ḥarth], and to any that desires the tilth [ḥarth] of this world ...
(42:20, Yusuf Ali)
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Here ḥarth figuratively references the rewards of paradise, which, in Is-
lamic texts, has many descriptions – none of which refer to cropped, no-longer-
living, and soon-to-decay fruits and vegetables. In contrast, Yusuf Ali’s
suggested translation of tilth offers what is effectively a farmer’s fallow field
ready to be worked as a believer’s reward. Paradise is not a field of enriched
soil, but a serene place of living gardens (jannat). Neither “a field of ready-to-
work soil” nor “a collection of cropped vegetation subject to consumption and
decay” responds to the metaphor. That metaphor, the ḥarth of Q. 42:20, reflects
a verdant, living paradise for those whose devotion and reverence have nour-
ished Allah’s reward. 
The English word garden provides a reading that is consistent with both
contexts. While tilth suggests a worked soil suitable for seeding, it also suggests
a land with decaying organic material and intimates its fallow state. In English,
a prepared soil that nourishes those who tend it and is, in turn, nourished by
them, is referred to both poetically and literally as a garden. A garden is both
the area prepared and tended by tilling, as well as the living, growing, and de-
manding flora therein. Garden names that which produces living bounty, the
good deeds you send forth (cf. Q. 2:223). Figuratively, it couples the fecundity
of intimacy referenced in Q. 2:223 and the living bounty of paradise referenced
in Q. 42:20. Tilth, on the other hand, captures neither of these meanings. Such
an understanding of the ḥarth metaphors in these two verses belies Hidayatul-
lah’s view and undermines Yusuf Ali’s translation. Hidayatullah claims that
“mutuality and love ... are disconnected” from the Qur’an’s “guidelines for
sexual conduct” (Feminist Edges, p. 135), even though Q. 2:222-23 provides
no basis for such a view. 
Using Yusuf Ali’s translation of the menses verses as a basis, the indicated
changes suggest the following reading:
They ask you about women’s menses. Say: it is an annoyance [adhān]. So
leave women alone at such times and do not seek intimacy until they bathe.
After they have bathed, then seek intimacy as Allah has enjoined. Truly Allah
loves those who turn to Allah, and loves those who care about cleanliness.
(2:222)
Your wives are a garden [ḥarth] for you, so visit your garden as [annā] you
wish ... (2:223)
Hidayatullah quotes Kecia Ali approvingly to suggest that wherever
egalitarian tafsīr “systematically avoids inconvenient verses” (Feminist Edges,
p. 135) and “selectively” presents egalitarian verses in isolation from their
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broader scriptural context, it is “fundamentally dishonest and ultimately fu-
tile” (Sexual Ethics, pp. 131-32). But this is so much bravado. Certainly the
Qur’an obliges one to reread those exceptionally rare verses that are selec-
tively and perversely understood to support extravagantly retrograde pre-
revelatory misogynistic attitudes and practices. It obliges believers to see
that such verses are vastly outweighed by the Qur’an’s forceful extolling of
marital peace, tranquility, and the succor of sexual harmony as well as to
read the Qur’an as a whole as opposed to piecemeal (Q. 5:14 and Q. 15:89-
93). It obliges believers directly by enjoining them “to find the best mean-
ing” (Q. 39:18). 
Admittedly, if there were no alternative readings conceivable for these rare
verses relished by traditionalist readings and if one were to consistently avoid
considering them, then one might be faulted. But to suggest that no alternative
readings are conceivable is unwise. Thus the charge of “fundamental dishon-
esty” may be read as an instance of hyperbolic pugnacity, a rhetorical prov-
ocation. As for egalitarian readings being “ultimately futile,” readers are invited
to review those commented on here so that they themselves may weigh which
readings better reflect the Word. 
Accordingly, Hidayatullah’s comment that “men are the only active par-
ticipants in determining the parameter of sexual conduct” with their wives (p.
135) is a misunderstanding. These āyāt address men’s queries about when they
may seek intimacy in accordance with the changed circumstances of the new
faith’s required observances. This understanding explains the grammatical con-
text that the Qur’anic verses directly imply. 
Q. When may we approach our wives and seek intimacy with them? 
A. Go to them (approach them) when ... . 
The Qur’an permits men to seek intimacy after their wives purify them-
selves (Q. 2:222-23) and after breaking the daily fast during Ramadan (Q.
2:187). No Qur’anic direction expresses and no verse ordains that only the
husband can determine the couple’s sexual conduct. The Qur’an’s wisdom
recognizes that in the complexity and depth of sexual intimacy, including
the seeking of such intimacy, active participation may sometimes take
the path of ritual acquiescence – a path that is open to either partner. Its wis-
dom in counseling mutuality, respect, and kindness thus envisages each part-
ner’s active participation, even if that consists simply of a welcome
accommodation. 
Of course, patriarchal apologists also celebrate other purportedly “male-
privileging” verses, like the notorious “wife beating” of Q. 4:34. Here, Hi-
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dayatullah begins unfortunately: Because God’s omniscience includes envis-
aging any and all interpretations of the infamous verb ḍaraba, God intended
“to beat” as a possible interpretation (Feminist Edges, p. 138). But first, any
interpretation may be poorly researched, dubious, and even preposterous. It
strains credulity to assert that “God envisaged preposterous interpretations”
amounts to “God intended preposterous interpretations.” Comparably, we
would not countenance the inference that “God envisaged evil” means “God
intended evil.” Allah’s omniscience does not imply Allah’s connivance. Sec-
ond and in any case, following Waqas Muhammad’s 8 painstaking research,
ḍaraba simply did not mean “to beat” in the era of revelation (Muhammad,
Wife Beating in Islam? p. 71) even if it has this as a common meaning in mod-
ern Arabic. 
Hidayatullah next confronts the “feminist” (i.e., egalitarian) tenet that the
Qur’an acknowledges sexual difference without assigning any corresponding
gendered roles (p. 154). She summarily misreads Q. 4:34, the very verse she
adduces to support Qur’anic gendered roles, to assert that it “charges men with
being the breadwinner (qiwāmah) for women” (p. 155). 
That she misreads the verse is clear, given that it is a response to yet an-
other of the men’s revelation-era uncertainties: “Are we still breadwinners
for our families in the (new) religion of Allah?” This question is answered:
“Men are breadwinners who spend of their wealth [inherited or from em-
ployment] on their families.” Therefore, this verse defines a role, limits what
a breadwinner is, and provides a job description.9 W. Muhammad refines our
understanding of this term by noting that it also is used for those believers
whose just witness supports God. (Muhammad, Wife Beating in Islam? p.
26) Thus, Q. 4:34 does not charge men with being exclusive breadwinners
for their families, let alone saddle them with this unique role. Rather, they
are breadwinners only insofar as they support their families. Indeed, to read
it as appointing men the sole breadwinners makes a mockery of known Is-
lamic history, for certainly it could not have escaped either the notice of Allah
or that of the Prophet, peace be upon him, that Khadijah was the breadwinner
throughout their marriage, as well as her many pregnancies and tribulations.
After her death, far from being diminished by her role within the family, the
Messenger, peace be upon him, treasured her memory for the remainder of
his life. 
Hidayatullah argues that men are nonetheless assigned a gender role by
default: Since they cannot bear children, they are to support the mother/wife
(and child) (p. 156). Thus, she says, the Qur’an in point of fact invests “biology
with content and meaning” (ibid.). Here she confuses anatomical difference
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(a lack of the relevant “equipment”) for gender difference in order to support
male privilege. No support for anti-egalitarian readings of the Qur’an is pro-
vided by observing that men, despite their inability to bear children, are to
play a role in supporting mothers/wives and their children. 
The Meaning of Equality
“Equal” is defined with brilliant economy in a masterful encyclopaedic English
dictionary thus: “Equal: (noun) one not inferior or superior to another.”10
Hidayatullah attempts to drive a wedge between genders by noting that
whereas the Qur’an invites mutuality, reverence for, and kindness to women,
none of this need be inconsistent with enjoining hierarchy, that is (one can
only assume), an anatomically based pecking order (pp. 160-61). This
amounts to the conjecture that equality (spiritual?) may be consistent with a
(corporeal) class system. However, since no convincing Qur’anic evidence
showing relevant difference supports her ostensibly useful distinction, this
asserted distinction is empty. What she suggests as evidence is simply not
evidence.
Men’s privilege might acquire some support if Q. 2:222-23 did not
guide their understanding simply as to when they may seek intimacy with
their recently menstruating wives. Hidayatullah might support a hierarchy
if this passage instructed husbands to ignore all of the verses enjoining mu-
tual respect, equal rights to intimacy’s serenity (sukūn), and kindness be-
tween marital partners. She might reasonably argue for men’s primacy if
the believing wives referenced here were incapable of understanding the
ritual role of post-menstrual bathing; if the passages commanded them to
assent to their husband’s imprecations; or, alternatively, if they were ge-
netically incapable of the myriad responses and gestures available through
God’s Grace implying diffidence, assent, warmth, denial, or enthusiasm,
to name but a few. 
Hidayatullah shares a cost with traditionalist interpreters. She asserts,
without evidence, that certain verses, including Q. 2:222-23, reach a “semantic
dead end.” Apparently she believes this permits her to categorize a host of
egalitarian verses enjoining the elimination of pre-revelatory inequalities in
worship, marriage, divorce, and family life as conflicting with central under-
lying Qur’anic themes, notably male privilege. She acknowledges a prepon-
derance of egalitarian verses but cannot conceive of how they might illuminate
and nourish the tellingly rare passages in which these alleged semantic dead
ends are reached. It is as if, impossibly, Allah were confused instead of some
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readers of Allah’s Word lacking the understanding or the will to continue
rereading it for meaning. A privileging patriarchal authority that denies equal
rights to women has no Qur’anic authority, for the Qur’an specifically denies
that any such differential authority derives from God’s authority. Equally
specifically, it never says that men alone are the managers either of women or
of their families, does not authorize men to beat their wives, does not prescribe
men’s initiation of sex with their wives, and does not say that men are a “de-
gree above” women.11
Paradoxically, Hidayatullah asserts that her views do not constitute a sur-
render to patriarchy and sexism, for she merely wishes to present “the possible
existence of both an egalitarian and a gender-hierarchical core” in the Qur’an
(p. 172). But the contention that semantic dead ends are reached in those verses
that are necessary to her case remains unproven. While the Qur’an might con-
ceivably authorize a gender pecking order, she has not identified any of its au-
thorizing pas-sages – and until she does so, given that controverting egalitarian
readings are readily available for each purportedly privileging verse, her claims
are without merit. 
Hidayatullah contends she has offered an “honest enquiry,” one that differs
from the “simplistic” one suggesting that Muslim “feminists” (i.e., egalitarians)
stand on the enlightened side of justice. The egalitarians’ simplistic inquiry re-
flects “a particular conception of equality and justice,” one that forces “anachro-
nistic readings of the Qur’an,” one not reconcilable with the Qur’an whose
“framework of justice” is not ours (pp. 172-73). Here she means to rebuke
egalitarians who dispute a gender-favoring Qur’an. But even if such verses ex-
isted – which they do not – she presents no evidence warranting the claim that
male-privileging verses take precedence in the Qur’an. That is, no Qur’anic
verses say “Some āyāt are important, some not,” and none say “The verses
that [purportedly] favor males have precedence.” 
What is true is that egalitarian readers of the Qur’an read its teachings to
prescribe the elimination of inequalities and injustices by way of seeking a
world in which Allah’s Justice is possible. An all-knowing merciful God could
not limit recognition of injustices to a specific era and place, thereby ignoring
those of other times and places. The Word of an omniscient God must recog-
nize injustice for each and every person, for each and every moment of history.
Furthermore, it is improbable to claim that a Western sense of justice has not
been informed by perceptions of historical inequalities eliminated in the in-
terest of Allah’s justice. Modern, Western concepts of equality and justice are
not irrelevant to egalitarian readings of the Qur’an, even if modern concepts
escaped application in seventh-century Arabia. A scripture is for all times and
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contains within it the possibilities of inexhaustible readings and meanings, a
theme embraced by Muslim theologians ever since the very beginning of
Islam.12
Of course, not all gender inequalities are unjust. Husbands may eat more
than wives, a form of inequality. But under a morally relevant description, their
eating does not deny a just distribution because (for purposes of illustration)
each person’s needs may be satisfied. By contrast, reading Q. 4:34 to define
men as the family’s exclusive breadwinners and thus precludes female bread-
winners, supports an inequality that is neither supported by a careful reading
of the verse nor the reality that Khadijah supported their family – a reality that
is clearly available for Allah’s contemplation and for that of all believers
throughout history. It cannot be the intent of conservative readings of the
Qur’an to mock Islamic history by ignoring it. 
Similarly, reading ḍaraba as “to beat” supports an inequality and is incon-
sistent with the earliest classical Arabic usage recorded for the word (Khalil
ibn Ahmad’s Kitāb al-‘Ayn, p. 71, as cited in Muhammad, Wife Beating in
Islam?). Instead, reading it with Muhammad to mean “to cite to an authority”
squares with the prevalent and central usage in classical Arabic (ibid.), the
Prophet’s own conduct in dealing with a woman “left hanging” (Q. 58:1-4),
and Q. 58:1-4, 4:35, which prescribes conditions for involving the authorities
in the divorce process. In short, none of the exceptional āyāt purporting to sup-
port male privilege in function, let alone male superiority in “being” (whatever
that might mean), in fact do so. 
Broadly, Hidayatullah, echoing conservatives who see egalitarianism as
anti-Islamic, suggests that Qur’anic “feminists” (i.e., egalitarian readers)
apply inapplicable modern, Western feminist concepts of equality and justice
to their readings. But the notion that “modern” concepts of equality and jus-
tice are inapplicable to the period of revelation is unsubstantiated. Moreover,
considerable evidence suggests that the implications of these supposedly
male-privileging verses were in fact recognized as iniquitous and unjust both
in the Qur’an and in revelatory-period justice. 
Recognition that beating one’s wife constituted an injustice is reflected
in Islam’s earliest history, for from the beginning this act provided grounds
for her to initiate divorce. In respect to breadwinners (qiwāmah), no modern
theory of equality need be applied to show that women of the era of revela-
tion could be and were recognized, both at that time and now, by all believers
as breadwinners for their families. Khadijah was a conspicuous example of
a woman who satisfied the definition of a breadwinner offered in Q. 4:34.
Further, every seventh-century widow and every independent widow since
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who has supported her family is a counterexample to the traditionalist mis-
reading of breadwinner as an exclusively male role. Again, no peculiarly
modern notion of inequality is applied to point out that conservatives mis-
read the figurative ḥarth to mean tilth, which includes the further confusion
of intimating a wife’s availability for “seeding” quite without regard to her
consent and, indeed, against her will. The Qur’an specifically and perva-
sively enjoins consideration, as well as kind and gentle conduct, between
spouses, prescriptions that from the beginning cast doubt on traditional pa-
triarchal readings of Q. 2:222-23. 
To sum up: Islam’s history, which saw wife beating as a grounds for di-
vorce, female bread-winners, and women self-consciously active in post-
menses bathing, belies the notion that the justice and equality of the
seventh-century were peculiar and somehow culturally alienated from a mod-
ern sense of justice and equality. The Qur’an’s pervasive and insistent enjoin-
ing of mutual respect, tenderness, and sexual reciprocity within marriage
pointedly argues against a misreading of ḥarth as tilth, which suggests that
women are passive receptacles for male seeding. Instead, it argues for a rec-
ognizably modern sexual equality. Thus, the idea that egalitarian readers rep-
resent an inauthentic Islamic fifth column, one that is foisting modern and
alien Western concepts of equality and justice upon Islam,13 is denied both by
Islam’s history and by the Qur’an itself. 
Hidayatullah represents herself as “Muslim feminist,” led by her under-
standing of God’s Word, to doubt either the text’s divinity or God’s justice
(pp. 194-97). Essentially, her position admits defeat in the face of what she
takes as passages that intractably favor male privilege. There is a note of schiz-
ophrenia in her resignation as she contemplates rejecting Qur’anic divinity
on the one hand or God’s justice on the other. She ends on a note of wan op-
timism: “[I]f gender justice [does] not fully cohere with the Qur’an ... we need
not despair (p. 197). She suggests that, in retrospect, her questioning may be
seen as one door closing, another opening (p. 197). What door might have
been opened?
The ability to pose a dilemma argues neither for its validity nor its en-
durance. Hidayatullah takes it as read that proponents of egalitarian tafsīr are
stuck with unjust male privileging verses. So, she proceeds to posit that if the
Qur’an is supposed to be God’s Word, either God is unjust or what is supposed
to be God’s Word is not, in fact, God’s Word. But egalitarian readers propose
an option that allows one to escape this dilemma: Traditionalists have misread
those verses that seem to be unjust male-privileging verses. Thus the dilemma
neither exhausts the possibilities nor endures because the assumption upon
110 The American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 34:3
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which it is based, that the Qur’an forces upon us inviolable but unjust under-
standings of Allah’s commands, is mistaken. 
Indeed, the foundation of much of the liberatory interpretation lies pre-
cisely in the contention that rereading the Qur’an to seek meaning consonant
with Allah’s justice is both possible and enjoined by scripture. So any assertion
that egalitarian readers must find certain verses inviolably male-privileging
comes to little more than a begging of an initial question: How are Qur’anic
verses to be read? Plumbing for a gender-privileging reading does little to ad-
vance the rigid patriarchal position that how certain verses are to be read is
closed, that their meaning is certain and forever fixed. What purports to be
novel in her position merely repeats, without substantiation or comment, what
patriarchal exegetes have insisted on for centuries.14
The dilemma that she poses fails because it does not exhaust all possible
alternatives. But in any case, no believer can contemplate the horns of a
dilemma that obliterates the foundations of faith. Since God is just, it is not
the Book whose divinity must be questioned, but rather those readings that
are apparently inconsistent with God’s Justice. To suppose that the Qur’an
may not be God’s Word is to doubt the foundation of the Islamic faith, the
Book of God’s revelation. Egalitarian readings of each of the verses that she
finds so profoundly unjust that she considers herself forced to propose such
a desperate dilemma suggest how she may go about rethinking her view.
In the end, Hidayatullah’s lack of clarity as to the form of her argument
is surprising. Perhaps she means to present egalitarians with a reductio ad
absurdum: “We’re stuck with verses you egalitarians claim are unjust. If
they’re unjust, then either the Qur’an isn’t God’s Word or God is unjust.
Since egalitarians can’t very well agree to either alternative, Qur’anic ‘jus-
tice’ must mean something different from what they take justice to be.” But
this reductio is a double-edged sword. Hidayatullah may speculate that some
verses resist rereading. But if she is to be taken seriously, she cannot insist
that they are incapable of rereading. And so her argument comes to this: “If
certain verses are read as unjustly male-privileging, then either the Book as
so read is not God’s Word or God as so understood is unjust.” Thus read,
her argument is a perfect reductio of the contention that some verses counsel
injustice. Barlas and Wadud have recognized what she has not: If patriarchal
readings unjustly privilege men, those readings are not consistent with God’s
Word and thus believers are obliged to reread such verses. There really is
no other option.
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9. Implied in Waqas Muhammad’s reading of 4:34. Cf. p.28
10. The Imperial Dictionary of the English Language, ed. Chas. Annandale (London:
1900).
11. The “degree” verse in question, Q. 2:228, sensibly says that if a man has second
thoughts while divorcing his wife and wishes to reconcile, the onus is on him (he
bears the greater responsibility) to initiate the reconciliation. Cf. Barlas, “Believ-
ing Women,” 194-95.
12. Barlas, personal correspondence. 
13. Which may be read as a subtext of Hidayatullah’s dispute with those readers of
the Qur’an who believe that it proposes a genuine equality in which neither sex
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entrenched in the practices of many jurisdictions of the ummah. Western com-
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